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ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE RESOURCE 
CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976 
Robert A. Weiland* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tragedy evidenced at the Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New 
York has served to alert the public to what has been referred to 
as the hazardous waste crisis.l The situation, however, has been 
long in developing, and, because of the dimensions of the prob-
lem, will require great time, effort and expense to solve. 
The General Accounting Office has estimated that industry will 
generate 56 millions tons of hazardous waste annually by 1980.1 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has adopted find-
ings that there are 32,000 to 50,000 waste disposal sites which 
may contain hazardous waste. Of these, 1,200 to 2,000 may con-
tain significant quantities of hazardous waste and, as such, may 
pose an immediate threat to the environment and the public. 8 
The estimated cost of cleanup is staggering: $3.6 to $6.1 billion 
for emergency site cleanup and damage mitigation and $26.2 to 
$44.1 billion to develop and implement safe disposal practices.4 
Partially in response to the hazardous waste problem, late in 
* Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
I Comment, The Hazardous Waste Crisis, 9 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10060, April 1979. 
• COMPTROLLER GENERAL, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WILL NOT BE EF-
FECTIVE; GREATER EFFORTS NEEDED 1 GAO, No. CED-79-14 (Jan. 23, 1979). 
• HART ASSOCIATES, INC., PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL 
HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS, 10-16 (February, 1979) cited in ToxIc SUBSTANCES STRAT-
EGY COMM. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ch.v, at 3, CEQ-EHTS-03 (August, 1979). 
• C. Legg, ESC Fact Sheet, Abandoned Waste Sites: The High Cost of Neglect (Envir. 
Study Conf., Mar.22, 1979), cited in The Hazardous Waste Crisis, 9 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 
10060, 10060 (1979). 
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1976 Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976 (RCRA):I The Act's overall objective is "to promote 
the protection of health and the environment and to conserve val-
uable material and energy resources ... "6 by advancing a com-
prehensive program to handle the problem of safe disposal of, and 
resource recovery from, solid waste.7 RCRA commences with 
statements of Congressional findings and objectives8 and contains 
several provisions addressing the general solid waste disposal 
problem.9 Because of the exceptional problemslo associated with 
hazardous waste,!l Congress enacted special provisions in RCRA 
containing detailed procedures regarding their management. 
These are found in Subtitle C,12 the Hazardous Waste Manage-
• Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 V.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976)), as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92 Stat. 3081 (1978) (current version at 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 
6901-6987 (1978)). 
• 42 V.S.C.A. § 6902 (1978). 
7 For an excellent overview of the entire Act see Andersen, The Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, WIS. L. REV. 633, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 633. 
8 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6907 (1978). 
• For example, the Act: 1) establishes an Office of Solid Waste within EPA and autho-
rizes the Administrator to implement the Act, 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 6911-6916 (1978); 2) estab-
lishes a procedure for states, regions within states, or interstate regions to develop a com-
prehensive plan for handling solid wastes, Id. §§ 6941-6949; 3) places with the Department 
of Commerce responsibility for developing standards for substituting secondary materials 
for virgin materials, markets for recovered materials, and for the promotion of resource 
recovery technology; Id. §§ 6951-6954; 4) requires all agencies of the federal government to 
comply with the Act, Id. §§ 6961-6964; 5) contains miscellaneous provisions, Id. §§ 6971-
6979; 6) authorizes the Administrator to promote research into the solid waste problem 
and provides for grants to be made in furtherance of the objectives of the Act. Id. §§ 6981-
6987. 
10 The Congressional Findings section of RCRA § 1002, states in pertinant part: "(b) 
Environment and health-The Congress finds with respect to the environment and health, 
that- ... (5) hazardous waste presents, in addition to the problems associated with non-
hazardous solid waste, special dangers to health and require a greater degree of regulation 
than does non-hazardous solid waste ... " 42 V.S.C.A. § 1002 (1978). 
11 "Hazardous waste" is defined in §loo4(5) of the Act as: 
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectous characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in 
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or 
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise 
managed. 
42 V.S.C.A. § 6903 (1978). 
" 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6931 (1978). The term "solid waste" is a misnomer in the context 
of hazardous waste as about ninety percent of all hazardous waste is in liquid or semi-
liquid form. See V.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS, DISPO-
SAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, No. SW -115, at Ix (1974). "Solid waste" is defined in 
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ment Subtitle. 
Subtitle C sets up a scheme for EPA to issue regulations for the 
identification and listing of hazardous wastes;I3 standards appli-
cable to generators, transporters, and owners and operators of 
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities;H per-
mits for hazardous waste facilities;UI and regulations for state haz-
ardous waste programs. IS The Subtitle also sets up a tagging sys-
tem to keep track of all hazardous wastes, i.e., a "cradle to grave" 
regulatory system. I7 Enforcement of the requirements of the Sub-
title are provided for in the Federal Enforcement section. IS 
The EPA has, considerably behind schedule/9 proposed regula-
tions to implement Subtitle CliO but, as comments are still being 
solicited, the final form of the regulations is uncertain. The regu-
lations will mandate the lawful procedures for permit acquisition 
and hazardous waste disposal. The enforcement mechanisms 
§ 1004(27) of the Act as: 
[AJny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment 
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, 
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, 
mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not in-
clude solid or dissolved material in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges 
which are point sources subject to permits under section 1342 of Title 33, or source, 
special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (68 Stat. 923). 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(27) (1978). 
J3 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921 (1978). 
,. Id. §§ 6222-6224 . 
.. Id. § 6225 . 
.. Id. § 6226 . 
.. Id. § 6227. 
,. Id. § 6228. 
,. The Act directed the Administrator to promulgate, by April 21, 1978, regulations: (a) 
for the identification and listing of hazardous wastes, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921 (1978); (b) estab-
lishing standards applicable to generators of hazardous wastes, id. § 6922; (c) establishing 
standards applicable to transportation of hazardous wastes, id. § 6923; (d) establishing 
standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and 
disposal facilities, id. § 6924; (e) requiring and establishing requirements for permits for 
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes, id. § 6925. 
In Illinois v. Costle, 9 ELR 20243 (D.D.C. 1979), the court ordered EPA to promulgate 
in final form the regulations to implement Subtitle C by December 31, 1979. In a report to 
the court on October 12, 1979, EPA said it would not be able to meet the deadline. The 
earliest that the regulations would be finalized, said EPA, would be April, 1980. See, gen-
erally, EPA Will Not Meet December Deadline for Hazardous Rules, Sets April Target, 
10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1423 (Oct. 19, 1979) for a full discussion of the report to the court. 
RCRA further mandates that the regulations will take effect six months after their pro-
mulgation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6930 (1978). 
I. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6931 (1978). 
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made available to the government in the Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Subtitle21 serve only to compel adherence to the regula-
tions. Consequently, until the regulations are promulgated the 
federal enforcement section of Subtitle C (Section 3008)22 will lie 
dormant. Furthermore, when the regulations for the rest of Subti-
tle C are promulgated, no specific enforcement regulations will be 
required, nor have any been proposed, to make Section 3008 oper-
ational. Consequently, barring amendment, the provisions of Sec-
tion 3008 will remain as they are regardless of the substantive 
content of the regulations for the rest of Subtitle C. 
In addition to those provisions for federal enforcement found in 
Section 3008, the Imminent Hazard section of RCRA, Section 
7003,23 establishes remedies to deal with those situations when 
"hazardous waste is presenting an imminent or :substantial en-
dangerment to health or the environment. "U The Imminent Haz-
ard section is the enforcement provision available to the govern-
ment until the Subtitle C regulations are promulgated. 
This article will analyze the enforcement mechanisms made 
available to the federal government by RCRA to control the dis-
posal of hazardous wastes. Because no cases have been reported 
in which the government has used Section 7003 and none have 
been brought using Section 3008 the analysis will be based on the 
language of RCRA, its sparse legislative history,211 and on analo-
gies to administrative interpretation and judicial construction of 
other, principally environmental, statutes. First, the Imminent 
Hazard provision26 will be explored. The discussion will include 
examinations of the meaning of the term "imminent or substan-
.. Id . 
•• Id. § 6928; on February 26, 1978, the EPA issued final hazardous waste regulations 
under RCRA for generators of hazardous wastes (40 CFR 262), for transporters of hazard-
ous wastes (40 CFR 263), and for notification of hazardous waste activities. See 45 FR 
12722, 12746. EPA plans to issue regulations under Section 3001 of the Act defining haz-
ardous wastes and under Section 3004 of the Act setting operating standards for treat-
ment, storage, and disposal facilities in April, 1980. As of April 15, 1980 these latter regu-
lations have not been issued . 
• a Id. § 6973 . 
.. Id . 
•• RCRA was passed hastily and without extensive discussion. For a discussion of the 
circumstances surrounding the passage of RCRA see Kovacs & Klucsic, The New Federal 
Role In Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 
3 COLUM. J. ENvT'L L. 205 (1977) . 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978). 
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tial endangerment,"17 the special requisites for obtaining an in-
junction in light of the fact that the power to bring suit for equi-
table relief is granted in the statute, and finally, with regard to 
Section 7003, the relief that may be granted. The Federal enforce-
ment section18 of Subtitle CIS will then be discussed. The article 
next will turn to the administrative and judicial enforcement op-
tions available to the government including compliance orders, 
civil penalties, and other civil actions. Finally, the criminal penal-
ties provision80 will be examined including a discussion of against 
whom criminal sanctions may be sought and of the mens rea re-
quirements for finding criminal liability. 
II. THE IMMINENT HAZARD PROVISION 
Until six months after the regulations for Subtitle C are 
promulgated,81 the only mechanism made available to the govern-
ment by RCRA to control the hazardous waste problem is the im-
minent hazard provision (RCRA Section 7003).81 Section 7003 
provides a vehicle for gaining court ordered remedies to deal with 
the imminent hazards created by mis-handling, storage, treat-
ment or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste. The govern-
ment has been able to institute suits utilizing Section 7003 be-
cause Section 7003, unlike the remedies provided in Subtitle C, is 
self-enforcing and does not need any regulations to come "on-
line."·· In addition to Section 7003 being currently of extreme im-
portance because of its present utility, it will remain a valuable 
tool after Subtitle C is in force because of its capacity for reach-
ing immediate hazardous waste problems. Section 7003 provides 
in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of 
evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-
posal of any solid waste or hazardous waste is presenting an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, 
17 Id . 
.. Id. § 6928 . 
•• Id. §§ 6921-6931. 
a. Id. § 6928(d). 
a, Subtitle C's regulations do not take effect until six months after they are promul-
gated. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6930(b) (1978). See note 19, supra, for a discU8sion of the delays in 
issuing the Subtitle C regulations. 
a. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978). 
aa E.g., United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., No. 79-514 (D. N.J., filed Feb. 2, 1979). 
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the Administrator [of EPA] may bring suit on behalf of the United 
States in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any 
person contributing to the alleged disposal to stop such handling, 
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal or to take such other 
action as may be necessary.S4 
As with all of RCRA, the legislative history on Section 7003 is 
sparse31i and no cases have gone to judgment utilizing the provi-
sion. As a result, two of the traditional tools used in construing 
statutes, case law and specific legislative history identifying con-
gressional intent, are not available for interpreting RCRA. An ex-
amination of the language of Section 7003 and analogies to other 
(principally environmental and health and safety) statutes con-
taining language similar to that found in Section 7003, presently 
provide the means, then, of construing the provision. 
A. The Meaning of the Imminent and Substantial 
Endangerment Standard 
The key to the interpretation of Section 7003 is an understand-
ing of the phrase "imminent and substantial endangerment," and, 
in particular, whether relief is available before harm occurs or 
merely to stop actual harm. An accepted definition of the word 
"imminent" is a suitable point of departure for an understanding 
of what will be the administrative and judicial attitudes toward 
the use of Section 7003. "Imminent" has, according to the Sev-
enth Circuit, "been the subject of considerable judicial atten-
tion, "38 and finding it unnecessary to cite individual cases to but-
tress its assertion, the Court concluded that "it is clear that 
'imminent' refers to something which is threatening to happen at 
once, something close at hand, something to happen upon the in-
stant, close although not yet touching, and on the point of 
happening. "37 
Imminent, then, means close in point of time, but closeness is a 
term of many degrees, according to the circumstances. The ex-
pressed purpose of RCRA partially defines the circumstances 
under which Section 7003 is to be utilized. As stated in the House 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978) (emphasis added). 
•• See note 25, supra . 
•• Continental Ill. Nat. B. & T. Co. of Chicago v. United States, 504 F.2d 586, 591 (7th 
Cir. 1974), citing 20 WORDS AND PHRASES 215 (1959) . 
.. 504 F.2d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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Report on the Act, "it is the purpose of this legislation to 
provide nationwide protection against the dangers of improper 
hazardous waste disposal."38 The Report stated further, "[u]nless 
neutralized or otherwise properly managed in their disposal, haz-
ardous wastes present a clear danger to the health and safety of 
the population and the quality of the environment."39 
Since RCRA was passed in part as a health and safety statute"o 
a compelling argument can be made that judicial interpretation of 
phrases similar to "imminent endangerment" in other safety stat-
utes reflect on the administrative and judicial construction that 
will be made of Section 7003. In construing the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,41 the Seventh Circuit in 
Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Board of Mine Operations 
Appeals,42 after identifying the Act as a "remedial and safety 
statute,"43 cited with approval" the Fourth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the term "imminent danger" as it appeared in the Act.u 
The Fourth Circuit had stated: "an imminent danger exists when 
the condition or practice observed could reasonably be 'expected 
to cause death or serious physical harm to a miner if normal min-
ing operations were permitted to proceed in the area before the 
dangerous condition is eliminated. "46 The Seventh Circuit ex-
panded upon the Fourth Circuit's definition by stating, "[a]n im-
minent threat is one which does not necessarily come to fruition 
but the reasonable likelihood that it may, particularly when the 
•• H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT) re-
printed in (1976) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6238, 6249 [hereinafter cited as 1976 U.S. 
CODE) . 
•• HOUSE REPORT at 3, 1976 U.S. CODE at 6241. 
•• Id. See also RCRA § 1003(4) which states that one of the objectives of the Act is: 
"regulating the treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes which 
have adverse effects on the health and the environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 6902(4) (1978) . 
.. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-960 (1978) . 
•• 504 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) . 
•• Id. at 744 . 
.. Id. at 745 . 
•• 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(a) stated: 
If, upon any inspection of a coal mine, an authorized representative of the Secretary 
finds that an imminent danger exists, such representative shall determine the area 
throughout which such danger exists, and thereupon shall issue forthwith an order re-
quiring the operator of the mine or his agent to cause immediately all persons, except 
those referred to in subsection (d) of this section, to be withdrawn from, and to be 
prohibited from entering, such area until an authorized representative of the Secretary 
determines that such imminent danger no longer exists . 
•• Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. V. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 491 F.2d 
277, 278 (4th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original). 
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result could well be disasterous, is sufficient to make the impend-
ing threat virtually an immediate one."47 
While there is no RCRA legislative history on point, an 
analagous provision of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDW A)48 
and its legislative history shed further light on congressional in-
tent in using the word imminent. The legislative history of SDW A 
Section 300i(a),49 a provision authorizing actions for injunctive re-
lief against "imminent and substantial endangerment to health" 
that closely parallels Section 7003, states: "[a]dministrative and 
judicial implementation of this authority must occur early enough 
to prevent the potential hazard from materializing. . . . [W]hile 
the risk of harm must be 'imminent' for the Administrator to act, 
the harm need not be. "110 
This risk analysis is supported by an important decision con-
struing an environmental statute. In Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA, III the Eighth Circuit addressed the meaning of the phrase 
"endangering the health and welfare of persons" found in the 
Clean Water Act:1I2 "[i]n the context of this environmentallegisla-
tion, we believe that Congress used the term 'endangering' in a 
precautionary or preventive sense, and, therefore, evidence of po-
tential harm as well as actual harm comes within the purview of 
47 Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 504 F.2d 741, 
745 (7th Cir. 1974) . 
• a 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 300(f)-300(j) (1978). 
•• This section provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title [42 V.S.C. §§ 300(f)-300(j)), the Ad-
ministrator, upon receipt of information that a contaminant which is present in or is 
likely to enter a public water system may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to the health of persons, and that appropriate State and local authorities have 
not acted to protect the health of such persons, may take such actions as he may deem 
necessary in order to protect the health of such persons. To the extent he determines it 
to be practicable in light of such imminent endangerment, he shall consult with the 
State and local authorities in order to confirm the correctness of the information on 
which action proposed to be taken under this sub-section is based and to ascertain the 
action which such authorities are or will be taking. The action which the Administrator 
may take may include (but shall not be limited to) (1) issuing such orders as may be 
necessary to protect the health of persons who are or may be users of such system 
(including travelers), and (2) commencing a civil action for appropriate relief, including 
a restraining order or permanent or temporary injunction. 
42 V.S.C.A. § 300i(a) (1978) . 
•• H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in [1974] V.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 6454, 6488 . 
• , 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane) . 
• , 33 V.S.C.A. § 1364 (1978). 
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the term. "113 
The Court in Reserve Mining went on to adopt the interpreta-
tion of the word "endanger" made by Judge Wright in a dissent-
ing opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPAII4. in the context of a provision 
of the Clean Air Act:1III 
The meaning of "endanger" is, I hope, beyond dispute. Case law and 
dictionary definition agree that endanger means something less than 
actual harm. When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual 
injury need ever occur ... "Endanger," ... is not a standard prone 
to actual proof alone. Danger is a risk, and so can only be decided by 
assessment of risks ... [A] risk may be assessed from suspected, but 
not completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from 
trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, 
or from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as "fact. "116 
Judge Wright's interpretation was also subsequently adopted by 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a later case.1I7 The Court in 
the latter decision concluded, "that the 'will endanger' standard 
is precautionary in nature and does not require proof of actual 
harm before regulation is appropriate. "118 
Imminent means close in time. An imminent danger is one 
where there is a reasonable liklihood that the feared accident or 
disaster will come to fruition. As seen through reference to the 
Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act, imminent 
hazard provisions are inserted in environmental statues as a pre-
caution against potential harm. Thus, the imminent and substan-
tial provision of RCRA is designed to prevent harm before it 
occurs. 
B. Application of the Imminent and Substantial 
Endangerment Standard 
Since "imminent and substantial endangerment" is a risk stan-
•• Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane) . 
•• Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, No. 73-2205, at 11 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion) cited in 
Reserve Mining . 
•• 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 . 
... Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, No. 73-2205, at 31-33 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion) (em-
phasis in original) (citations omitted), quoted in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 
529 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane) . 
.. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 941 (1976) . 
.. [d. at 17. 
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dard, the potential for harm satisfies the usual prerequisite of in-
junctive relief that there is a reasonable cause to believe the de-
fendant is in violation of the statute. 
The second usual requirement for injunctive relief is that of ir-
reperable injury. However, in an action where the public interest 
is reflected in a statute, proof of irreperable injury is unnecessary; 
"[I]rreperable injury need not be shown, since if harm is shown 
(in a violation of an environmental statute case), the danger to 
the public's health and welfare has already been established by 
Congress. "119 
The third principle factor used by courts in determining the 
propriety of enjoining a violation of a federal statute is whether 
an injunction is called for in the public interest. Passage of Sec-
tion 7003 was an expression of the public interest so that granting 
of injunctive relief, when there is an imminent and substantial 
danger as discussed above, would be in the public interest. A bal-
ancing of the equities is not necessary to grant an injunction in 
order to give effect to a declared policy of Congress.60 
It is clear, then, that where it is shown that violations of Sec-
tion 7003 exist, regardless of whether the harm is potential or ac-
tual, and regardless of whether irreperable injury is shown, in-
junctive relief should be granted. As stated by the Seventh 
Circuit with regard to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,t'1 
"the question boils down to whether the practices are illegal, for 
if they are, since the standards of the public interest, not the re-
quirements of private litigation, measure the need for injunctive 
relief, an injunction should be issued. "62 
•• United States v. West Penn Power Co., 11 ERC 2203, 2215 (W.D. Penn. 1978). In this 
case the United States sought a preliminary injunction to restrain violations of regulations 
issued under the Clean Air Act. See also, United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 
(5th Cir. 1969). In the Hayes case, the court granted a preliminary injunction to restrain 
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and stated: 
Where, as here,. . . an injunction is authorized by statute and the conditions are satis-
fied as in the facts presented here, the usual prerequisite of irreparable injury need not 
be established and the agency to whom the enforcement. . . has been entrusted is not 
required to show injury before obtaining an injunction. 
415 F.2d at 1045 . 
• 0 See United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); Sierra 
Club v. Coleman, 405 F.Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 440 
F.Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1977) . 
• , 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1978) . 
•• Walling v. Panther Creek Mines, 148 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir. 1945). 
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c. Relief Available Under Section 7003 
If an injunction is issued, the question arises as to what may be 
ordered. Certainly, as stated in RCRA, any illegal handling, stor-
age, treatment, transportation or disposal of wastes may be or-
dered to cease. S3 In addition, however, the court may order a vio-
lator "to take such other action as may be necessary."Sf 
In United States v. Kin-Bue, Ine.,s, a case in which an injunc-
tion was recently demanded, the government is invoking Section 
7003 in an attempt to halt operations at a hazardous waste land-
fill.sS After alleging a cause of action under Section 7003, the gov-
ernment demanded, in part, the following relief: 
a) A preliminary and permanent injunction . . . from allowing 
suffering, or causing the discharge of any refuse or pollutants from 
the Landfill; 
b) An order mandating Defendants to prepare and implement a 
plan, for closure of the Landfill; 
c) An order mandating Defendants to prepare and implement a 
plan for post-closure care of the Landfill; 
d) An order mandating Defendants to fulfill all ~ontinuing obliga-
tions imposed by the terms of the above plans for a period of at least 
twenty years; 
e) An order mandating Defendants to post a performance bond in 
the amount of $25,000,000 to be held by the court for twenty years for 
the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of each of the 
above.67 
Whether the courts will grant the kinds of relief demanded in 
Kin-Bue remains to be seen. Basically, the government is de-
manding closure, pollution control and a performance bond to en-
sure such control. These demands are not out of line with the 
objectives of RCRA which include promoting "the protection of 
health and the environment . . . by . . . prohibiting future open 
dumping on the land and requiring the conversion of existing 
open dumps to facilities which do not pose a danger to the envi-
ronment or to health. "S8 The imminent and substantial danger, if 
found to exist, would last, of course, until there is little chance of 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978) . 
.. Id . 
•• United States v. Kin-Bue, Inc., No. 79-514 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 2, 1979) . 
.. Id. at 25-28 . 
• 7Id . 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6902(3) (1978). 
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a waste dump polluting the environment. The government is well 
within the guidelines of the statute, therefore, in demanding clo-
sure and insurance against pollution originating from the dump. 
III. SUBTITLE C: ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 
While the Imminent Hazard provision of RCRA89 may be uti-
lized at present,70 the enforcement mechanisms available to the 
government through Subtitle cn of RCRA do not become effec-
tive until six months after the Hazardous Waste Management 
regulations are promulgated.72 Regardless of the substantive con-
tent of the regulations, however, the procedural and substantive 
aspects of the administrative and civil enforcement provisions73 
will remain, barring amendment, as enacted.74 This section of the 
article will analyze the administrative and civil enforcement pro-
visions found in Subtitle C.n Because no cases have (or could 
have) been brought utilizing the provisions and, further, because 
of the paucity of legislative history,78 the bulk of the analysis will 
proceed by construing the language of the Act and by analogising 
to existing enforcement provisions found in other environmental 
statutes. 
The administrative and civil federal enforcement provisions of 
Subtitle C are found in Section 3008.77 The pertinent78 provisions 
•• Id. § 6973. 
70 See text at notes 32-33, supra. 
71 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6931 (1978) (also referred to as the Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Subtitle) . 
.. See note 31, supra. 7. 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(b)(c) (1978). 
74 See text at notes 21-22, supra . 
.. 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(b)(c) (1978). See text at notes 31-69, supra, for a discussion of 
the Imminent Hazard provision and see text at notes 193-239, infra, for a discussion of the 
Subtitle C criminal enforcement provision. 
78 See note 25, supra. 
77 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928 (1978). 7. Section 3008(a)(2) directs the Administrator to give affected States notice of 
violation: 
(2) In the case of a violation of any requirement of this subchapter where such viola-
tion occurs in a State which is authorized to carry out a hazardous waste program 
under section 6926 of this title, the Administrator shall give notice to the State in 
which such violation has occured thirty days prior to issuing an order or commencing a 
civil action under this section. 
42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(2) (1978). Section 3008(b) provides for public hearings under some 
circumstances: 
(b) Public hearing-Any order of any suspension or revocation of a permit shall 
become final unless no later than thirty days after the order or notice of the suspension 
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of Section 3008 are: 
(a) Compliance orders-(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
whenever on the basis of any information the Administrator [of EPA] 
determines that any person is in violation of any requirement of this 
subchapter, the Administrator shall give notice to the violator of his 
failure to comply with such requirement. If such violation extends be-
yond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's notification, the Ad-
ministrator may issue an order requiring compliance within a speci-
fied time period or the Administrator may commence a civil action in 
the United States district court in the district in which the violation 
occurred for appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent 
injunction. (3) If such violator fails to take corrective action within 
the time specified in the order, he shall be liable for a civil penalty of 
not more than $25,000 for each day of continued noncompliance and 
the Administrator may suspend or revoke any permit issued to the 
violator (whether issued by the Administrator or the State). (c) Re-
quirements of compliance orders-Any order issued under this sec-
tion shall state with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation 
and specify a time for compliance and assess a penalty, if any, which 
the Administrator determines is reasonable taking into account the 
seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with 
the applicable requirements.78 
Simply stated, the administrative and civil enforcement proce-
dure commences with a notice of violation from the Administra-
tor of EPA to a violator. If, thirty days after notice, the violation 
continues, the Administrator may refrain from taking action,80 
may issue a compliance order81 buttressed, if necessary, by a civil 
penalty,82 or may commence a civil action for relief.8s 
Notice of violation, then, is the threshold action that must be 
taken by the Administrator to pursue administrative and civil en-
forcement.84 As such a notice has not yet been issued under the 
authority of RCRA, a discussion of what such a notice will proba-
or revocation is served, the person or persons named therein request a public hearing. 
Upon such request the Administrator shall promptly issue subpoenas for the attend· 
ance and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books, and 
documents, and may promulgate rules for discovery procedures. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(b) (1978). 
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(l) (1978). 
•• See text at notes 98·103, infra . 
• , 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928 (a)(I),(c) (1978); see text at notes 107-130, infra . 
•• [d. § 6928(a)(3); see text at notes 131-168, infra . 
• s [d. § 6928(a)(I); see text at notes 169-192, infra . 
•• [d. § 6928(a)(I). 
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bly entail must focus on the Act itself and on the general require-
ments for notice as found in other statutes. 
When the Administrator811 determines that any person86 is in 
violation of any requirement of the Subchapter, he must give no-
tice to the violator of his failure to comply with such require-
ment.87 As the EPA ordinarily issues an official notice of violation 
in cases concerning violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA),88 it 
is possible that the same procedure will be followed as to notices 
of violations of RCRA. In any case, the notice must be adequate 
and effective or it is not considered notice.8e To meet this test the 
notice must contain information concerning the fact of violation 
and it must actually be communicated to an authorized person by 
the Administrator. 
There is a discrepency between the legislative history concern-
ing notice and the intent of Congress as found in Section 3008 as 
enacted. The House Report specifies certain items of information 
that the notice should contain: "the Administrator, when he finds 
that there is a violation of the provisions relating to hazardous 
wastes, shall issue a notice to the violator which contains, with 
reasonable specificity, the nature of the violation, the time for 
compliance, and the penalty for noncompliance. "eo The above 
language, found in RCRA's legislative history, was not inserted 
into the statute as defining the requirements for notice. Almost 
identical language, as to time for compliance and a penalty for 
•• The term "administrator" is defined in the Act at RCRA § 1004(1) as: "the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency." As the Administrator has subdelegated 
his enforcement authority under the Clean Water Act to the Administrators of EPA's re-
gional offices [EPA Order No. 1260.6, Sep. 14, 1973], it is probable that he will do the 
same as regards enforcement of RCRA, so that subsequent references in this article to the 
term "Administrator" are meant to include Regional Administrators as well as the Na-
tional Administrator. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(1) (1978) . 
•• The term "person" is defined in the Act at RCRA §1004(15) as "an individual, trust, 
firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, 
association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(15) (1978) . 
• 7 I d. § 6928(a)(I) . 
•• The official name is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-
1376 (1978). The Act is commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA) and will be 
referred to as such in this article. See P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train; 393 F. Supp. 1370, 
1373 (D. D.C. 1975), for an example of the EPA issuing an official notice . 
•• Kansas & Mo. Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Beal, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (D. Kan. 
1972) . 
• 0 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 30-31, 1976 U.S. CODE at 6268-69. 
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noncompliance is, however, found later in Section 3008 concern-
ing the requirements for compliance orders.91 Although it would 
be possible to insert the time for compliance and the penalty for 
noncompliance in the notice, it would be counterproductive. Be-
sides the fact that RCRA mandates that such information be in 
the compliance order,92 the Act also instructs the Administrator 
to take into account any good faith efforts to comply with the 
applicable requirement in assessing a penalty.93 Any curative ac-
tion taken by the violator during the thirty day grace period man-
dated between notice and compliance order9• should be included 
in the Administrator's calculations of good faith effort and, there-
fore, the penalty should not be assessed in the notice. The con-
gressional requirement that the nature of the violation be in-
cluded in the notice9!! should, of course, be adhered to. 
There need not be personal service as "adequate notice is no-
tice reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances sur-
rounding a given proceeding, to apprise all interested parties of 
the action."96 Furthermore, once an entity is given notice of a vio-
lation, the entire entity is held to have received that notice as 
"the breakdown of internal communication procedure in even the 
largest organizations will not justify lack of information."97 
The statute affords a violator a thirty day grace period in which 
to bring his actions into compliance with the noted requirements 
of the Subtitle.98 At the conclusion of the thirty days, the Admin-
istrator may decide to take no action. Enforcement under Subti-
tle C is discretionary, as the statute merely proposes that "the 
Administrator may issue an order requiring compliance within a 
specified time period. . . . "99 
OJ 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(c) (1978). For a discussion of the use of compliance orders, see 
text at notes 107-130, infra . 
•• Id . 
•• Id . 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(1) (1978) . 
•• Id . 
•• U.S. v. San Juan Lumber Co., 313 F. Supp. 703, 709 (D. Colo. 1969). See also Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, stating: "[t]he reasonableness and hence con-
stitutional validity of any chosen method [of service] may be defended on the ground that 
it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected .... " 339 U.S. at 315; Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
97 McCubbry v. Boise Cascade Home & Land Corp., 71 F.R.D. 62, 71 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
See also Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Grinnell, 59 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) . 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(1) (1978). 
BB Id. Some environmental legislation purports to make enforcement mandatory by us-
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Some action at the conclusion of the thirty day grace period is 
preferable, however, both from the standpoint of congressional in-
tent and internal EPA enforcement strategy. Congress' intent in 
enacting the penalties in Subtitle C was to "permit a broad vari-
ety of mechanisms so as to stop the illegal disposal of hazardous 
wastes."lOO Thus, should the Administrator choose not to pursue 
some form of enforcement, congressional intent, as expressed in 
the legislative history would be frustrated. Further, Douglas 
Costle, EPA Administrator, recently stated, "I think EPA's credi-
bility turns in large measure on the people whom we regulate 
knowing that we mean business. "l01 Yet Congress has determined 
that discretion is preferable in Subtitle C enforcement. lOt Only 
upon a future examination of EPA Subtitle C enforcement poli-
cies maya conclusion be drawn as to whether Congress' determi-
nation was correct. As the penalty that may be assessed in any 
compliance order is discretionary, it would seem the compliance 
order is where the Administrator should show his flexibility. 
Nothing is gained by communicating to a person the fact of his 
noncompliance with the statute, and then doing nothing about it 
when his noncompliance continues. If there are special mitigating 
circumstances, these should be taken account of in the flexible 
civil penalty provision discussed below. lOS 
If the violation continues through the termination of the grace 
period the Administrator, should he choose to take further action, 
has two options. 1) He may issue a compliance order stating the 
nature of the violation, specifying a time for compliance and as-
sessing a penalty, if any;104 and, if the violator fails to rectify the 
violation within the time alloted, the Administrator may initiate 
court action for a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of contin-
ing the word "shall" in place of "may." Enforcement thus appears to be mandatory in the 
CWA, 33 V.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(3) (1978). In this section the word "shall" is in place of the 
word "may" that appears in RCRA. There is, however, judicial disagreement on the 
mandatory nature of the word "shalL" See Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 
1977); South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 130 (D.S.C. 
1978). 
100 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 31, 1976 V.S. CODE at 6269. 
,., 9 ST. MARY's L. J. 661, 662 (1978). 
,.2 See note 99, supra. A possible reason for the discretionary nature of the enforcement 
provisions is the limited extent of EPA's resources. 
'.S 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(3) (1978). For a discussion of this provision see text at notes 
131-168, infra. 
,.4 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(1), (c) (1978). 
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ued violation;loll or 2) the Administrator may initiate civil pro-
ceedings for appropriate relief, including an injunction.loe 
A. Option One: Compliance Order and Civil Penalty 
Option One may be summarized as an administratively issued 
compliance order mandating a violator's adherence to the require-
ments of RCRA. The compliance order may, in addition, impose 
an administrative penalty. Should the violator not take the requi-
site action within the time alloted in the compliance order, he will 
be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 per day of 
violation. 
1. Compliance Order and Administrative Penalty 
The Administrator's first option, should a violation continue 
thirty days after notice has been given to the violator, is to issue a 
compliance orderlo7 and, if the Administrator chooses this option, 
he must follow the procedure set out in Section 3008(c).108 The 
order must "state with reasonable specificity the nature of the vi-
olation"lo9 and must require compliance within a specified period. 
It would be, therefore, efficacious to indicate what actions will be 
required of the violator to satisfy the order. Both the actions 
mandated by the order and the time period given for compliance 
should be reasonable;llo however, administrative agencies have 
wide discretion in formulating remedies and time limitations ade-
quate to ensure compliance with statutes.lll 
10. [d. § 6928(a)(3). 
108 [d. § 6928(a)(I). 
107 A compliance order mandates that particular action be taken by persons subject to 
the Administrator's jurisdiction so that, upon compliance with the order, an acceptable 
level of attainment will have been reached. A compliance order commands a violator to, in 
fact, adhere to the requisites of the Act. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 59, 1976 
U.S. CODE at 6297. 
108 RCRA § 3008(c) states: 
Any order issued under this section shall state with reasonable specificity the nature of 
the violation and specify a time for compliance and assess a penalty, if any, which the 
Administrator determines is reasonable taking into account the seriousness of the vio-
lation and any good faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(c) (1978). 
108 [d. 
110 [d. 
III "Administrative officers and agencies may be, and, where not expressly or impliedly 
restrained by law, generally are, vested with discretion in the exercise of their power and 
the performance of their duties." 73 C.J.S. Public and Administrative Bodies and Proce-
dure § 61 (1951). See F.T.C. v. Henry Brooks & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 364 (1964), discussing 
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As there are no cases construing Section 3008 and there is no 
legislative history on point,112 other statutes and cases must be 
examined in order to determine what may be a reasonable time 
for compliance. Federal courts have generally held that what may 
be a reasonable time for compliance in a particular case is a mat-
ter of fact in that case. 118 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) contains language, very similar to 
that in RCRA, mandating the reasonable time standard for com-
pliance with administrative orders.1l• In Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA/lIS a decision interpreting the CWA, the Eighth Circuit ad-
ded, in addition to seriousness of violation and good faith efforts 
to correct the situation, further factors to be weighed in determ-
ing what is a reasonable time. ll6 In a situation that evidences an 
absence of imminent danger, 117 these additional factors are the 
degree of economic displacement that would be triggered by too 
short a time given for compliance and the harm that would accrue 
to the country from the loss of a source of necessary goods. 118 
Neither the statute nor the legislative history of RCRA alludes 
to either economic displacement or jeopardizing sources of goods 
as factors to be taken into account in determining the reasonable-
ness of the Administrator's timetable for compliance. Reserve 
Mining suggests, however, that, in the environmental sphere, 
an administrative agency's latitude in ordering compliance with the law in a decision re-
viewing and approving a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist order against a food 
broker who had violated 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(c) (1978). See also, City of Chicago v. Federal 
Power Comm'n, 385 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1967), which stated: "when an agency is exercising 
powers entrusted to it by Congress, it may have recourse to equitable conceptions in striv-
ing for the reasonableness that broadly identifies the ambit of sound discretion." 385 F.2d 
at 642. 
". See note 25, supra. 
"3 "It is perfectly apparent that the words 'reasonable time' have no set limits and no 
precise definition, and it is well settled that what is a reasonable time depends entirely 
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case ... " In Re Sternberg, 300 F. 881, 
884 (D. Conn. 1924). See also Salmon v. Helena Box Co., 147 F. 408, 410 (8th Cir. 1906). 
,1< The CWA provides in pertinent part: 
Any order issued under this subsection. . . shall specify a time for compliance ... not 
to exceed a time the Administrator determines to be reasonable in the case of a viola-
tion of a final deadline, taking into account the seriousness of the violation and any 
good faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements. 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(S)(A). 
110 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
"8 [d. at 537-38. 
117 Imminent dangers are addressed in RCRA at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978). For a dis-
cussion of this section, see text at notes 31-68, supra. 
"8 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537-38 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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these are factors to be considered. The court in Reserve Mining 
alluded to a suggestion that unemployment might have been more 
harmful to the health of a family than the continuation of the 
environmental violation that was the source of the complaint in 
the case.119 It may be appropriate, then, to include consideration 
of economic displacement and the potential loss of sources of 
goods in the determination of the seriousness of a violation of 
RCRA. As the perceived danger to human health and the envi-
ronment grows, however, the economic factors delineated in Re-
serve Mining lose their importance. Only when the "risk of harm 
to the public is potential, not imminent or certain,"120 should the 
court supplied economic factors be considered when the Adminis-
trator, or the court, is determining what is a reasonable time for 
compliance. 
The compliance order must, in addition to stating the nature of 
the violation and the time for compliance, "assess a penalty, if 
any, which the Administrator determines is reasonable taking 
into account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith 
efforts to comply with the applicable requirements."121 Thus the 
statute gives the Administrator, when issuing a compliance order, 
the option, at that time, of informing the violator of a penalty. 
There is little guidance in determining how much the penalty 
should be, other than that the Administrator should consider 
"the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to 
comply .... "122 The legislative history is silent on the point.123 
In conformity with the policy found in other environmental stat-
utes,tu however, an administrative penalty under RCRA equat-
119 [d. 
120 [d. 
121 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(c) (1978) . 
... [d. 
'" See note 25, supra . 
... The Clean Air Act, for instance, requires the EPA to impose mandatory noncompli-
ance penalties after August 7, 1979.42 V.S.C.A. § 7420 (1978). The thrust of this section is 
to remove from polluters the economic benefits of delayed compliance. The section states, 
in pertinent part: 
(2) The amount of the penalty which shall be assessed and collected with respect to 
any source under this section shall be equal to-
(A) the amount determined in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator under subsection (a) of this section, which is no less than the economic 
value which a delay in compliance beyond July 1, 1979, may have for the owner of such 
source, including the quarterly equivalent of the capital costs of compliance and debt 
service over a normal amortization period, not to exceed ten years, operation and main-
tenance costs foregone as a result of noncompliance, and any additional economic 
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ing, at the least, the cost of noncompliance with the economic 
value of delay in compliance, would further the purpose of the 
legislation to protect human health and the environmentm with-
out, at this stage of the proceedings, causing too severe an eco-
nomic displacement. The fact, however, that an administrative 
penalty may be sufficient to put an entity out of business is not 
enough, absent more, to act as a defense to the penalty. A fair 
statement of the law is, "the authority conferred upon an agency 
may be broad in scope, and may embrace the taking of measures 
which will put the polluter out of business. "126 This assertion may 
have been somewhat mitigated by the court in Reserve Mining 
which modified an injunction that had ordered the immediate 
closing of a major industrial plant.127 The court stated, "A remedy 
should be fashioned which will serve the ultimate public weal by 
insuring clean air, clean water, and continued jobs in an industry 
vital to the nation's welfare."128 Although this was a decision re-
garding equitable relief, it is reasonable to assume that the same 
reasoning will apply to administrative penalties.129 If so, a penalty 
in the amount that a company saved by not adhering to the stat-
value, which such a delay may have for the owner or operator of such source minus 
(B) the amount of any expenditure made by the owner or operator of that source 
during any such quarter for the purpose of bringing that source into, and maintaining 
compliance with, such requirement, to the extent that such expenditures have not been 
taken into account in the calculation of the penalty under subparagraph (A). 
42 V.S.C.A. § 7420(d)(2)(A)-(2)(B) (1978). 
"' See 42 V.S.C.A. § 6902(4) (1978) . 
.. I 61 Am. Jur. 2d Pollution Control § 116. See Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm., 
2 Pa. Cmwlth. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971) holding that the taking of measures which would 
require one who was in business since 1898 to shut down did not confiscate property with-
out due process of law. The Bortz court analyzed the question as one of obedience to 
police power. See, C.B. & Q. Railway v. Drainage Comm'rs., 200 V.S. 561 (1905), where the 
Court stated: "lilt has always been held that the legislature may make police regulations, 
although they may interfere with full enjoyment of private property and though no com-
pensation is given." [d. at 594. See also New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage 
Commn'r's, 197 V.S. 453 (1903) in which the Court held that "uncompensated obedience 
to a regulation enacted for the public safety under the police power of the State ... [isl 
not taking property without due compensation." [d. at 462. 
117 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
". [d. at 537 . 
.. t Although a request for equity ordinarily involves a balancing of the equities, such is 
not the case when a court is requested to grant an injunction to give effect to a declared 
policy of Congress. See text and notes at note 60, supra. Thus, the standards applied to a 
review of an administrative penalty and those applied to the granting of an injunction in 
an action in which the public interest is reflected in a statute will not vary significantly. In 
any case, courts, as in Reserve Mining, have shown a sensitivity to the problem of entities 
being forced out of business. 
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ute, if enough to put the company out of business, may be con-
strued by the courts to be unreasonable. On the other hand, as 
the legislative history of RCRA points out, "It is the purpose of 
this legislation to assist the cities, counties, and states in the solu-
tion of the discarded materials problem and to provide nation-
wide protection against the dangers of improper hazardous waste 
disposal. "130 There is no indication whether Congress adopted the 
Eighth Circuit's Reserve Mining reasohing when it subsequently 
enacted RCRA, but it is clear that neither on its face, nor in its 
legislative history, does the statute call for a balancing of environ-
mental protection with economic loss. The test of the Administra-
tor's reasonableness in assessing a penalty in the compliance or-
der should be whether he took into account the seriousness of the 
violation and any good faith efforts at compliance, as it was the 
clear intent of Congress to stop unregulated hazardous waste 
disposal. 
2. Penalties for Not Adhering to a Compliance Order 
The compliance order mandated in RCRA, and its concomitant 
administrative penalty, are designed to force a violator to take 
corrective action. If the violator has failed to take the proper cor-
rective action within the time specified in the compliance order, 
he shall be liable for a civil penalty131 of not more than $25,000 
per day and the Administrator may suspend or revoke the viola-
tor's permit.l81 
The principle question with regard to the civil penalty provi-
sion is what penalty will EPA consider appropriate, and thus 
seek, in any particular case. There is sparse legislative history on 
point,laa and no cases have been brought under Section 3008, so 
.ao HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 11, 1976 U.S. CODE at 6249. 
III A civil penalty is one imposed to ensure the performance of duties or conduct re-
quired by the State in carrying out its various sovereign functions. The Supreme Court has 
affirmed the constitutionality of the imposition of a civil penalty by stating, "the power of 
the State to impose . . . penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coequal 
with government .... " St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 
66 (1919), quoting Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885). The court 
had previously held that, "there is no inhibition upon a State to impose such [civil] penal-
ties for disregard of its police regulations as will ensure prompt obedience to their require-
ments." Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364, 367 (1892). 
u. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(3) (1978). See HOUSE REpORT, supra note 38, at 59, 1976 U.S. 
CODE at 6297. The civil penalty provision is to be used only in enforcement actions involv-
ing noncompliance with an order. 
U. See note 25, supra. 
,. 
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that sources farther afield must be examined to construct an anal-
ysis of the Section 3008 penalty provision. As Section 1319(d) of 
the Clean Water Act134 and Section 7413(b)(1) of the Clean Air 
Act131i contain civil penalty provisions similar to those found in 
Section 3008 of RCRA,136 an examination of enforcement policies 
under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act will help to 
define the probable parameters of enforcement under RCRA. The 
Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act enforcement policies were an-
nounced on April 11, 1978 when EPA published its Civil Penalty 
Policy-Clean Water Act Violators and Stationary Source Viola-
tors of the Clean Air Act. ls7 This policy provides guidance to the 
Agency's regional enforcement personnel in determining how 
much of the statutory maximum should be sought in a particular 
action. As an aid, then, in determining how RCRA will be en-
forced, a short examination of the Civil Penalty Policy follows. 138 
B. Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act Civil Penalty Policy 
The announced purpose of the Policy "is to assist in accom-
plishing the goals of environmental laws by deterring violations 
134 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (1978). 
136 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b)(l) (1978). 
136 Section 309(d) of the CWA provides: 
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328 or 1345 of this title, 
or any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit 
issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a State, and any 
person who violates any order issued by the Administrator under subsection (a) of this 
section, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such 
violation. 
33 U.S.C. Section §1319(d). The parallel provisions of the CAA provide: 
The Administrator shall, in the case of any person which is the owner or operator of a 
major stationary source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence a civil 
action for a permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil penalty 
of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or both, whenever such person-(I) vio-
lates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under subsection (a) of this 
section. 
42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(I). RCRA § 3008(a)(3) states in pertinant part: '''If such violator fails 
to take corrective action within the time specified in the order, he shall be liable for a civil 
penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day of continued noncompliance .... " 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(3) (1978). 
137 As reported at 41 ENVIR. REP. FEDERAL LAWS (BNA) 1101 [hereinafter referred to in 
the text as the "Civil Penalty Policy" or "Policy"]. 
"6 It should be clear that what follows are EPA's considerations in determining maxi-
mum and minimum amounts to be sought under various circumstances, but that in any 
case that goes to judgment, the exact amount of the penalty will be determined by the 
court. 
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and encouraging voluntary compliance. "139 The EPA believes that 
most citizens and public and private entities will voluntarily com-
ply with environmental statutes and regulations, but that a 
minority will not.HO It is to "keep faith" with those who comply 
and to promote compliance that the penalty policy was pro-
mulgated. HI 
In addition to deterrence, EPA delineates four further justifica-
tions for the Policy. First is to deprive violators of any economic 
advantage that may be gained through noncompliance, and thus 
to help ensure fair economic competition;142 second is the claim 
that by internalizing pollution costs the market economy will 
better function by including in costs the price of pollution 
cleanup instead of having the public absorb the costs;H3 third is 
that of compensating the public for harm done to the environ-
ment or to public health;H4 fourth is to aid in the efficient use of 
government resources by ensuring high voluntary compliance 
rates. HtI 
Four primary considerations are used in deciding upon the ap-
propriate penalty, up to the statutory maximum, that will be 
sought in each case. These are: "the harm done to public health 
or the environment; the economic benefit gained by the violator; 
the degree of recalcitrance of the violator; and any unusual or ex-
traordinary enforcement costs thrust upon the public. The policy 
(also) recognizes appropriate mitigating circumstances or 
factors. "146 
The civil penalty provision is to be used only in enforcement 
actions involving noncompliance with an order.U7 As such, the 
Policy applies to situations where the violator's failure to comply 
with the order is a result of its' "failure to make capital or opera-
tion and maintenance expenditures necessary to bring itself into 
... compliance with the requirements [of the the order] (e.g., 
failure to install equipment, . . . carry out a process change, 
••• Penalty Policy, supra note 137, at 1102. 
"·Id . 
... Id . 
... Id . 
••• Id . 
... Id . 
••• Id. 
"·Id. 
U7 For a discussion of the civil action authorized in RCRA § 3008(a)(1), see text at 
notes 169-192, infra. 
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etc.)."148 The Policy does not apply to penalties for criminal viola-
tions,149 for violations of court orders, or for penalties assessed 
under the Imminent Hazard section of RCRA.IIO 
The Civil Penalty Policy makes it clear that penalties are not 
substitutes for compliance. "Compliance with the law is 
mandatory,"181 and there may be no trade-off of penalties and 
noncompliance. 111 Those charged with enforcement may not bar-
gain for compliance by offering a reduction in penalties because 
the penalty policy already contains economic incentives for rapid 
compliance; that is, lower penalties.118 Furthermore, the Policy 
makes it clear that penalties are not fees and that payment of a 
penalty does not give an entity any right to continue in violation 
of the order or to slow down compliance. 1" 
The Civil Penalty Policy sets forth a methodology for deter-
mining the minimum civil penalty that should be "presented to 
the court as an appropriate penalty to be imposed."111 The meth-
odology is also used to "determine a lower 'minimum civil penalty 
acceptable for settlement' to be used in settlement negotia-
tions."IH Following is a summary of the methodology. 
1. Determining The Minimum Civil Penalty 
The minimum civil penalty may not, of course, end up to be 
more than the statutory maximum. To determine the amount of 
the minimum civil penalty the Policy puts forth the following 
stepS:lI'1 
Step I-Factors Comprising Penalty 
"Determine and add together the appropriate sums for each of 
the four elements of this policy, namely: 
10. Penalty Policy, supra note 137, at 1103. 
100 For a discuaaion of the criminal penalties authorized in RCRA § 3008(d), see text at 
notes 193-239, infra. 
,ao 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978); RCRA § 7003. For a discussion of this section, see text at 
notes 31-68, supra . 
.. , Penalty Policy, supra note 137, at 1103. 
'II Id. 
'··Id. 
'N Id. 
'N Id. 
'M Id. The Policy also states that where settlement is not achieved, the ordinary course 
will be to claim the maximum statutory penalty in the complaint. 
II. Penalty Policy, supra note 137, at 1104-1105. 
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A. [T]he sum appropriate to redress the harm or risk of harm 
to public health or the environment. "168 The dollar amount will 
be difficult to calculate and will have to be determined on a case 
by case basis. Costs of environmental restoration and traditional 
personal injury damage concepts may be used. 
B. "[T]he sum appropriate to remove the economic benefit 
gained or to be gained from delayed compliance."168 This includes 
benefits gained from delaying capital expenditures (and the op-
portunity to invest these funds alternatively) and the avoidance 
of operation and maintenance expenses. 
C. "[T]he sum appropriate as a penalty for the violator's de-
gree of recalcitrance, definance, or indifference to requirements of 
law."leo Non-frivolous challenges to EPA or Court determinations 
should not be penalized, but any deadline missed during a chal-
lenge is a violation. 
D. "[T]he sum appropriate to recover unusual or extraordi-
nary enforcement costs thrust upon the public. "lel This does not 
include attorney's fees or court costs but is intended to reimburse 
the government for non-routine detection of violations. 
Step 2-Reductions For Mitigating Factors 
"Determine and add together sums appropriate as reductions 
for mitigating factors ... (typically): 
A. [T]he sum, if any, appropriate to reflect any part of the 
noncompliance attributable to the government itself."!el This ap-
plies if, for instance, the government delays in holding a public 
hearing requested by the violator!68 
B. "[T]he sum appropriate to reflect any part of the noncom-
pliance caused by factors completely beyond the violator's con-
II. [d. at 1104 . 
... [d. 
'10 [d. 
18' [d . 
... [d . 
... See RCRA § 3008(b) which states: 
(b) Public Hearing-Any order or any suspension or revocation of a permit shall 
become final unless, no later than thirty days after the order or notice of the suspen-
sion or revocation is served, the person or persons named therein request a public hear-
ing. Upon such request the Administrator shall promptly conduct a public hearing. In 
connection with any proceeding under this section the Administrator may issue sub-
poenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant 
papers, books, and documents, and may promulgate rules for discovery procedures. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(b) (1978). 
666 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:641 
trol."164 This would include for example, fire or flood. 
Step 3-The Result 
Subtract the Step 2 total from the Step 1 total and the result is 
the minimum civil penalty. 
2. Determining The Minimum Penalty Acceptable For 
Settlement 
The prospect of settlement does not obviate the objectives of 
an enforcement action; i.e., compliance and penalties. To en-
courage settlement, officials may reduce the penalty below the 
minimum civil penalty. The reduction may not be greater than 
the chance, in percentage terms, of losing the action in court. 
This figure should not be more than 25 % .1611 
3. Penalty Postponement Or Forgiveness Based Upon Inability 
To Pay 
If a violator can establish its inability to pay a penalty, the pen-
alty may be forgiven or postponed if its imposition would cause 
the violator very serious economic hardship. This provision of the 
Policy deals with the oft stated complaint that environmental en-
forcement too often causes severe economic displacement. The 
EPA, while making the above concession as regards a penalty, 
makes it clear that there can be "no such concession . . . with 
respect to the cost of coming into compliance. "166 Thus, it is clear 
that if the cost of compliance is beyond the financial resources of 
an entity, the operation causing the pollution must cease.16? 
Finally, the Civil Penalty Policy mandates that the civil pen-
alty and the administratively imposed penalty should not dupli-
cate each other as regards penalties based upon the economic 
benefit of delayed compliance during the same time period. 168 
In summary, Option One is a compliance order mandating ad-
herence to the law coupled with an administrative penalty, fol-
lowed, if necessary, by a court action for a civil penalty not to 
, •• Penalty Policy. supra note 137. at 1104. 
, •• [d. 
, .. [d. at 1107. 
'8' See text at notes 126-130. 8upra, for a discussion of the possibility of EPA adminis-
trative action putting a firm out of business. 
, .. Penalty Policy. supra note 137. at 1103. 
---------- -------
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exceed $25,000 per day of continued violation. 
C. Option Two: Civil Action 
1. Liability in General 
667 
The second option open to the Administrator, should a viola-
tion extend beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's no-
tice, is for the Administrator to bring a civil action "for appropri-
ate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction. "188 
This action may be taken without the Administrator having is-
sued a compliance order. Allowing the EPA to seek immediate 
relief in this situation conforms to the internal logic of the Act. If 
the perceived violation does not rise to the level of an imminent 
hazard, which would be covered by Section 7003/70 this option 
allows the Administrator to seek a quick cessation of a violation 
of Subtitle C regulations. It would be inconsistent, however, if the 
only remedy available to EPA under Option Two was an injunc-
tion. Should the Administrator choose to move quickly under this 
option, instead of using the compliance order-civil penalty route 
described above as Option One, a violator would escape without a 
monetary penalty unless the words "appropriate relief" encom-
passes such a penalty. The question, then, is when Congress ex-
plicitly instructs the Administrator to seek injunctive relief, do 
compensatory and/or punitive damages come within the statutory 
term "appropriate relier?" 
As there is not legislative history defining what Congress in-
tended by the use of the term "appropriate relief" in RCRA,171 
cases construing the term, as it is used in other statutes, must be 
utilized to explain its meaning. The general rule is that the gov-
ernment, as plaintiff in a civil injunctive proceeding to enforce a 
public interest statute, is entitled to remedies that ensure "the 
full effectiveness of the Act."nl As a consequence, compensatory 
damages are available.178 The statute gives the district court the 
II. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a) (1978). 
1" [d. § 6973. For a discussion of this provision, see text at notes 31-68, supra. 
1.1 See note 25, supra . 
.. I See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967) (involving the 
enforcement of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-466 (1978». See 
also United States v. Underwood, 344 F.Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. 
Douglas County, 5 ERC 1577 (D.C. Nev. 1973). 
1'. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,204 (1967); United States v. 
Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Underwood, 344 F.Supp. 
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power to grant injunctive relief. 17• The decision whether to imply 
the remedy at law of compensatory damages into the term "ap-
propriate relief' must take into account the intent of Congress in 
the area. Among the stated objectives of the Act is "promoting 
the demonstration, construction, and application of solid waste 
management, resource recovery, and resource conservation sys-
tems which preserve and enhance the quality of the air, water, 
and land resources."1711 This language supports a policy of 
nondegradation of these resources,178 and, as such, RCRA should 
be enforced so as not to allow hazardous wastes to significantly 
pollute the environment. 
If a violator does not clean up identified hazardous wastes, af-
ter being ordered to do so by either the Administrator or the 
courts, the government may feel compelled to rectify the situation 
itself. If this occurs, the government should be able to recover its 
costs.177 Should the courts not construe RCRA so as to give the 
government the opportunity to collect compensatory damages for 
cleaning up hazardous wastes, one of two anamolies would occur. 
The government may either choose not to expend the money nec-
essary to prevent the deterioration of the environment, and thus 
the intent of Congress to preserve the environment would be frus-
trated, or the government could choose to clean up the waste/7S 
but would be subject to a financial penalty for carrying out the 
will of Congress. 
Judge Friendly, in a decision interpreting the Rivers and 
Harbors Act,17. gave an additional reason why compensatory 
damages must be available to the government: 
The remedy of damages is less burdensome to the defendant since it 
486 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
114 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(I) (1978). 
17. [d. § 6902(7). 
178 For a discussion of similar language appearing in the Clean Air Act, see Hines, A 
Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of 
Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643 (1977). 
177 Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967). See also United 
States v. Underwood, 344 F.Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (interpreting the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899) which states: "[WJhere the party causing the injury to navigable 
waters refused to remedy the situation or for some other reason the United States is com-
pelled to perform the remedy, the government is entitled to the equivalent cost in dam-
ages." 344 F.Supp. at 494. 
178 The government could either contract with a private firm, or have the Corps of Engi-
neers do the job. 
178 United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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relieves him of having to undertake a task which he may have neither 
the knowledge nor the skill to perform or supervise. More important, 
it assures the United States the speedy and competent removal of an 
obstruction to navigation which may be vital to the avoidance of acci-
dents imperiling life, limb or property, to the interests of commerce, 
or even to the national defense. We can think of no sensible reason 
why Congress should have desired that if the executive branch 
chooses to effect immediate removal of an obstruction, through the 
services of the Corps of Engineers or otherwise, rather than resort to 
the slower injunctive process of the courts, the offendor should 
thereby escape his due. ISO 
If, then, compensatory damages are available, may the govern-
ment also demand punitive damages? Punitive, or exemplary, 
damages may generally be awarded when a defendant acts with 
reckless disregard of the law,18l to punish him for outrageous con-
duct182 and to deter its future occurrence.18S 
Punitive damages would punish violators of the statute and 
would, doubtless, help deter other violators. Mitigating against 
the use of punitive damages is the fact that the statute contains 
"a broad variety of mechanisms to stop the illegal disposal of haz-
ardous wastes. "184 One of these mechanisms, providing penalties 
for certain knowing violations of the Act, is criminal sanction. 
Whether, however, criminal sanctions will serve their normal 
functions of retribution and deterrence is questionable. The gov-
ernment is hesitant to bring criminal charges for environmental 
infractions1811 and, in any case, will only be successful where viola-
tion is willful,l88 Consequently, the situation where the violator 
exhibits overt intransigence, where the violator has acted with 
marked indifference to the quality of the environment and to the 
rights of the public, may be the appropriate occasion for punitive 
damages. 187 
'8. Id. at 758 . 
••• Signer v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Covington Co., 455 F.2d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 
1972) . 
••• Phillip v. United States Lines Co., 240 F.Supp. 992, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1965) . 
••• Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F.Supp. 166, 172 (C.D. Calif. 1974) . 
••• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 31, 1976 U.S. CODE at 6269 . 
••• See Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, Thoughts On The Role of Penalties In the Enforce-
ment of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. I, 26-27 (1978-79). 
'88 For a discussion of the criminal penalties section of RCRA, see text at notes 193-239, 
infra . 
•• 7 The question has arisen, however, whether the constitutional prohibition against 
double jeopardy forbids the imposition of punitive damages for conduct that is criminally 
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2. Civil Liability Of Corporate Entities And Corporate 
Employees 
The compensatory civil penalty discussed above imposes strict 
liability for breach of the Act in that, although good faith can 
mitigate the amount of the penalty, neither knowledge nor negli-
gence need be proven to find a violation and assess a penalty.188 
As such, there is no bar to finding civil liability in a corporate 
entity. 
The civil penalty provision of the Act is directed at violations 
by any person.l81 As a consequence, individuals as well as entities 
are liable. ItO Both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act 
(but not RCRA) specify that the word "person" includes any "re-
sponsible corporate officer. "111 This phrase was added, it would 
seem, merely to add congressional emphasis to the provision, be-
cause there is no doubt that the word "person" includes individu-
als as well as corporate entities. II. 
lt is, of course, up to the EPA to decide whom to pursue when 
assessing civil penalties. If a corporate officer is responsible, for 
instance, for decisions which result in the illegal dumping of haz-
ardous wastes in a town's water supply, the EPA must determine 
if there would be a salutory effect in fining the officer as well as 
the corporation. Ultimately these are policy decisions for the Ad-
ministrator to make. 
punishable. See Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of 
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158 (1966) arguing that, although "the utility of 
punitive damages appears to require their imposition ... [when] conduct [is] criminally 
punishable but rarely or never prosecuted. . . double jeopardy principles seem to forbid 
[the] imposition [of damages]." 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. at 1184-85. But see One Lot Emerald 
Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972), in which defendants' 
acquittal on a smuggling charge did not bar a later proceeding to forfeit goods allegedly 
smuggled. The court stated, "If for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal 
trials nor two criminal punishments." 409 U.S. at 235. 
,.. Although the legislative history of RCRA is silent on this point, the legislative his-
tory of the Clean Air Act, in discUBBing civil penalties, makes it clear that such penalties 
may be imposed without regard to the actor's knowledge or negligence. See, H.R. REP. No. 
294, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 70-71, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1077, 
1148-1149. 
, •• 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a) (1978). 
'10 "Person" is defined in the Act as: "an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company 
[or] corporation .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(15) (1978). 
"' CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(3) (1978); CWA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 131(c)(3) (1978). 
,n Contra, "A person can develop a cold, a corporation can't develop a cold, therefore a 
corporation is not a person." D. RUNYON, Guys AND DOLLS. 
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IV. CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN SUBTITLE C 
Because "many times when there is a willful violation of a stat-
ute which seriously harms human health, criminal penalties may 
be appropriate,"le3 Congress included in Subtitle C a criminal 
penalty provisionle4 to supplement the Imminent Hazard provi-
sion of Section 7003181 and the administrative, civil and equitable 
remedies discussed above/ell of Section 3008(a) and (C).197 Crimi-
nal sanctions will be imposed for knowingly transporting hazard-
ous wastes to a facility without a permit, for failure to have a 
permit allowing treatment, storage or disposal, and for false state-
ments with regard to compliance with the statute. lee First convic-
tion carries maximum penalties of $25,000 for each day of viola-
tion or imprisonment for one year, or both. lee Subsequent 
convictions double the maximum penalties.20o Unlike the Clean 
Water Act, which mandates a minimum fine of $2,500 per day of 
violation upon conviction,201 no minimum fine is specified in 
RCRA. 
On its face, the statute contains criminal penalties only for fail-
ure to have a permit (and for making certain false statements), 
, •• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 30, 1976 U.S. CODE at 6268. 
'04 (d) Criminal Penalty.-Any person who knowingly-
(I) transports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a 
facility which does not have a permit under section 6925 (or 6926 in the case of a 
State program), or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act, 
(2) treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this 
subchapter without having obtained a permit under section 6925 (or 6926 in the 
case of a State program) or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Re-
search, and Sanctuaries Act, 
(3) makes any false statement or representation in any application, label, mani-
fest, record, report, permit or other document filed, maintained, or used for pur-
poses of compliance with this subchapter, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a 
fine of not more than $25,000 for each day of violation, or to imprisonment not 
to exceed one year, or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a 
first conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a 
fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not 
more than two years, or by both. 
42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (1978). 
, •• 42 V.S.C.A. § 6973 (1978). 
, .. See text at notes 69-192, supra. 
'.7 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 6928(a), 6928(c) (1978). 
, •• 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (1978). 
, •• [d. 
100 [d. 
I.' 33 V.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(l) (1978). 
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not for mere unsafe hazardous waste disposal. As a result, a per-
son who safely disposes of hazardous wastes but who failed to ob-
tain a permit, is liable for criminal prosecution.202 On the other 
hand, a person who disposes of hazardous wastes unsafely, but 
who has a permit, is only liable for civil penalties or must abide 
by an equitable order.2oa 
Although the House Report concluded "that criminal penalties 
might have been appropriate for willful violations of the Act"204 it 
is clear that criminal penalties may not be imposed if a permit 
has been obtained. The House Report states: 
The use of criminal penalties are sufficiently narrow in that they only 
apply to those who knowingly transport hazardous waste to a facility 
which does not have a permit, the actual disposal of hazardous wastes 
without a permit, or the falsification of documents, all of which are 
more serious offenses than the other provisions of the hazardous 
waste title.20' 
It follows, then, that a person who illegally disposes of waste, but 
who has a permit, is safe from criminal prosecution. 
Interestingly, both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act 
provide criminal sanctions for either "willful or negligent" or 
"knowing" violations of substantive sections of the respective Act, 
as well as for violations of permit requirements.206 For example, 
the Clean Water Act provides, "Any person who willfully or negli-
gently violates section 1311 ... of this title ... shall be pun-
ished [by criminal sanctions]."207 Section 1311 makes certain dis-
charges of pollutants unlawfu1.108 As a result, the willful discharge 
of pollutants under circumstances not in compliance with the 
Clean Water Act is a criminal act. This is not the case with sub-
stantive violations of RCRA. It may be possible to obviate this 
anomoly by reasoning that a permit, once issued, is merely a per-
mit for legal disposal. Any disposal that is done outside the terms 
of the permit or the relevant regulations, may be considered to be 
done without a permit. In this way, a person who has obtained a 
permit for legal disposal, but who, nevertheless, engages in illegal 
1.1 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (1978). 
I.S 42 V.S.C.A. § 6928 (1978). 
I .. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 30, 1976 V.S. CODE at 6268. 
I •• Id. at 6269. 
"" See 33 V.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (1978); 42 V.S.C.A. § 7443(c) (1978). I., 33 V.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(l) (1978). 
1.8 33 V.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (1978). 
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disposal, has acted without a permit with regard to the illegal dis-
posal and should therefore be subject to criminal prosecution 
under the statute. Congress has not stated any reasons why know-
ing violations of RCRA, other than a lack of a permit or falsifica-
tion of records, are not criminal acts. Perhaps the circumstances 
did not occur to the collective congressional mind when the Act 
passed. In any case, it seems to be an oversight easily remedied 
by amendment. 
RCRA provides criminal sanctions only for those persons who 
"knowingly" violate the permit or false reporting paragraphs.2oe 
(Like the other provisions of Section 3008, the criminal penalties 
do not become effective until the substantive regulations of Subti-
tle C are promulgated). The degree of conscious culpability con-
tained in the word "knowingly" must be explored in order to un-
derstand the circumstances under which criminal prosecutions 
will be successful under RCRA. 
Any person who, with actual knowledge, transports, treats, 
stores or disposes of hazardous wastes without a permit or who, 
with actual knowledge, makes a false statement is, of course, 
criminally liable.210 As there are no cases construing Section 
3008(d), an examination of how the word "knowingly" is generally 
judicially defined will be helpful in delineating the parameters of 
the word beyond actual knowledge. Certainly the "knowingly" 
standard eliminates any actions done by mistake or accident. m 
Further, this is not a negligence standard, where the "actor 
should have been aware of certain facts if reasonable care had 
been taken .... "212 
"Knowledge," however, does not mean merely actual 
knowledge. Most circuits agree that the use of the word "know-
200 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (1978). 
210 Id. 
III See United States v. Haney Chevrolet, Inc., 371 F.Supp. 381 (M.D. Fla. 1974), in 
which the court, in construing the word "knowingly" as it is found in the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1857 f-2(a)(3) (1978) stated: "The statute states that it is unlawful for a dealer 
'knowingly to remove or render inoperative' certain emission control devices or elements of 
design from a vehicle. It is well-settled that an act is done knowingly when it is done 
voluntarily and intentionally, and not be mistake or accident." 371 F.Supp. at 384. See 
also Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1969), in which the court quoted with 
approval the trial court's jury instruction which stated: "[aJn act or a failure to act is 
knowingly done if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or acci-
dent or some other innocent reason." 406 F.2d at 1294 n.3. 
I .. Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties In the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. I, 14 (1978-79). 
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ingly in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but 
includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive 
knowledge only because he consciously avoided it."21s 
By construing "knowledge" in this way, persons may not escape 
criminal liability under the Act by closing their eyes to the possi-
bility of noncompliance. As the Second Circuit has summarily 
stated, "[c]onstruing 'knowingly' in a criminal statute to include 
willful blindness to the existance of a fact is no radical concept in 
the law."u. 
A. Corporate Criminal Liability Under RCRA 
As there are no cases that have utilized the criminal provisions 
of RCRA, an examination of judicial decisions construing other 
criminal statutes is necessary to understand the extent of corpo-
rate liability for knowing violations of the Act. Unlike the ease 
with which corporate civil liability may be found,2u~ an additional 
factor must be considered when dealing with corporate criminal 
liability. The statute bases all criminal enforcement on a person 
knowingly violating certain provisions of the Act.216 As a corpo-
rate entity cannot, as such, have knowledge, corporate criminal 
liability must be based on imputed knowledge.21'7 The courts have 
formulated a rule for deciding whose knowledge will be imputed 
to a corporation, and under what circumstances.u8 
It is the knowledge of any employee, acting within the scope of 
his employment, that is the knowledge of the corporation. 211 
"Congress may constitutionally impose criminal liability upon a 
business entity for acts or omissions of its agents within the scope 
of their employment. . . . Such liability may attach without 
proof that the conduct was within the agent's actual authority, 
and even though it may have been contrary to express instruc-
III United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1976) (and cases cited therein). 
This is the analysis adopted in the Model Penal Code. Section 2.02(7) states: "When 
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge 
is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE §27 (Prop. Official Draft 1962). 
"'4 United States v. Saranton, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972). 
111 See text at note 188, supra. 
"" 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (1978) . 
... See Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976). 
"'" Id. 
"'" Id. 
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tions."lIl1o Further, it matters not what level of responsibility the 
particular employee with knowledge has. In a case in which a cor-
poration was held criminally liable for an act of a salesman, the 
court stated, "to deny the possibility of corporate responsibility 
for the acts of minor employees is to immunize the offender who 
really benefits, and open wide the door for evasion."121 
Commentators have argued, with regard to the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts, that imputing the knowledge of a nonmanager-
ial employee to the corporation for the purpose of finding crimi-
nalliability, "leads to harsh, and perhaps unjustifiable results."ulI 
Such a policy, it is argued, subjects the corporation to strict crim-
inalliability, as the corporation could be found guilty of an act by 
an employee which was both unknown to the management and 
against corporate policy.u8 
This argument is not valid with regard to RCRA. Section 
3008(d)(1) and (2) subjects a violating corporation to penalties for 
failure to obtain a permit.llu Regardless of at what level such a 
decision was made, Congress has determined that such conduct is 
a serious offense and that the justification for a full panapoly of 
penalties is to "stop the illegal disposal of hazardous waste."II11a At 
some point,1I118 a corporation must be responsible for unsafely 
dumping hazardous wastes: Congress has determined that the 
point is that of failing to obtain a permit. It is not, as is often 
argued in the literature,u7 non- or counter-productive to label a 
corporation a criminal violator. Rather, when advertising by many 
large potential hazardous waste dumpers runs considerably more 
heavily to image than product, the spectre of being labeled crimi-
nal would have a salutory effect. lie 
••• United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (and cases 
cited therein) . 
... United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1946) (and cases 
cited therein) . 
••• Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts On the Role of Penalties In The Enforcement of 
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. I, 21 (1978-79) . 
••• Id . 
... 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (1978) . 
••• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 31, 1976 U.S. CODE at 6269 . 
••• Id. 
'17 See, Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts On The Role of Penalties In The Enforce-
ment of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REv. I, 21 (1978-79) . 
••• See Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of 
the Environment, 37 ALB. L. REv. 61 (1972), for a good discussion of this concept. 
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B. Criminal Liability Of Corporate Employees Under 
RCRA229 
The courts have long determined that corporate officers could 
be subject to criminal penalties for certain acts of their corpora-
tions.lSo Certainly, if an executive directed that his corporation 
dump hazardous wastes without a permit, or knowingly acqui-
esced in such a violation, he would come within the ambit of the 
criminal section of the Act.281 
A more difficult question is whether, and to what degree, 
knowledge may be imputed to an individual corporate employee 
at the executive level. It is clear that if an employee purposefully 
closes his eyes to what is going on, knowledge will be imputed to 
him under a criminal statute.1S1 The question remains, however, 
whether knowledge may be charged to a corporate executive 
merely ~cause of his high supervisory position. The answer is 
uncertain. 
Although an executive need not be present at or personally su-
pervise the commission of an illegal act to be held criminally lia-
ble,1S3 "the general rule is that where the crime charged involves 
guilty knowledge or criminal intent, it is essential to the criminal 
liability of an officer of a corporation that he actually and person-
ally did the acts which constitute the offense, or that they were 
done under his direction or with his permission. "23" The illegal 
act must be expressly authorized as the authority to do a criminal 
act will not ordinarily be presumed . 
••• The material in this section of the article is included to elucidate the extent of crimi-
nalliability under RCRA. For a full discussion of the subject of criminal liability of corpo-
rate employees pre- United States v. Park, see Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of 
Corporate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALB. L. REV .. 61 (1972-73). For a 
more current treatment of the subject, as it obtains in the environmental field, see Olds, 
Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties In the Enforcement of The Clean 
Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1978-79) . 
• ao United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 
658 (1975). 
IJI See, State v. Lunz, 86 Wis.2d 695, 273 N.W.2d 767 (Wis. S.Ct. 1979); United States 
v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977) . 
• a. For a discussion of this concept see text at note 215, supra . 
••• Caroline Products Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1944) (and cases cited 
at 66) . 
••• Bourgois v. Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 7l4, 718 (S. Ct. Va. 1976). See also 19 C.J.S. 
Corporations § 931 (essentially same language as Bourgois); United States v. Dilliard, 101 
F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1938) (corporate officers have to be conscious promoters of a "scheme" to 
be found guilty). 
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There is some authority in support of a broader standard of 
imputing knowledge of illegal acts by a corporation to its execu-
tives. A court in the District of Columbia has stated, "[t]he presi-
dent of a corporation is generally its chief executive officer and it 
is a fair inference that he is acquainted with the conduct of the 
business of the corporation."I811 In addition, the Supreme Court 
has stated, with regard to criminal violations of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Comestic Act,188 that: 
[IJn providing sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who 
execute the corporate mission-and this is by no means necessarily 
confined to a single corporate agent or employee-the Act imposes 
not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they 
occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will 
insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight 
and vigilence imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond 
question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more 
stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who volunta-
rily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose ser-
vices and products affect the health and well-being of the public that 
supports them. IS., 
Similar reasoning may be applied with regard to prosecution of 
corporate officers under RCRA and certainly, as a matter of law, a 
corporate officer is not shielded by his position from liability for 
the criminal acts of the corporation.188 On the other hand, it is 
matter of fact whether, in a given case, an officer had the knowl-
edge necessary for criminal charges to be successfully brought. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed the potential for enforcement under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.llt The crucial ques-
tion is whether the enforcement provisions of the Act will aid in 
furthering the congressional objectives of prohibiting future open 
dumping and upgrading existing dumps, and to regulate all 
I •• United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 871, 872 (Mun. Ct. D.C. 1951). 
IN 21 U.S.C.A. § 333 (1978) (The entire Act is codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301·392 
(1978». 
II' United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (emphasis added). 
IN See text at notes 231·233, supra. 
1.0 Besides enforcement, the Act contains provisions encouraging recycling and research 
on the use of solid wastes. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6951·6954, 6981·6987 (1978). 
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phases of hazardous wastes. 240 
Section 3008 will not take effect until regulations are promul-
gated. Without the regulations, it cannot be predicted how far en-
forcement will go in dealing with the hazardous waste emergency. 
But, regardless of the substance of the regulations, some short-
comings in the Act are evident. 
The statute, on its face, applies only to future and present dis-
posal sites241 or to past disposal sites presenting an imminent haz-
ard.242 As such, there is no provision for many abandoned waste 
sites. As to those abandoned waste sites, even if imminently haz-
ardous, for which no deep enough pocket can be found to pay for 
safety measures, the Act speaks not at all. Various superfunds 
have been proposed, but as of this writing the immense problem 
of abandoned hazardous waste sites has not been adequately ad-
dressed. A superfund should be established and RCRA should be 
amended to establish requirements for inactive hazardous waste 
disposal sites. 
Finally, the criminal sanction section of the ActUS is weak. A 
new report by the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gation recommends strengthening the criminal penalties section 
of RCRA to allow imprisonment up to five years for the first vio-
lation and up to ten years for the second violation and to hold the 
responsible corporate officials who knew of illegal activities liable 
for their actions and the actions of their employees.244 
Safe disposal of hazardous wastes must be accomplished. The 
enforcement mechanisims of RCRA, if amended, expanded and 
vigorously enforced should be instrumental in reaching this goal. 
The key, it must be emphasized, will be vigorous enforcement 
and, when Subtitle C becomes effective, the EPA and the Justice 
Department must quickly assert strong enforcement policies . 
••• Id. § 6902(3)(4) . 
... Id. §§ 6921-6931. 
... Id. § 6973 . 
... Id. § 6928(d) . 
... HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION, HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 
(Comm. Print 96-IFC 31). 
